A new report purports to provide a roadmap for accountability at the Oregon Department of Transportation. In short, its a work of conflicted consultants, with a long history of cost overruns and excessive spending, offering slightly recycled versions of measures that have failed to control costs for the past decade.
Oregon’s highway department has a problem with chronic cost overruns. The report from AtkinsRéalis-Horrocks purports to address this problem, but actually offers more the same. These consultants have failed to clearly diagnose the underlying problem, have significant conflicts of interest, have their own long history of cost overruns and excessive spending, and are offering slightly recycled versions of measures that have failed to control costs for the past decade.
The authors of the management review—two senior sales executives at consulting firms hoping to expand in Oregon—have conflicts of interest that are not disclosed or addressed.
In their time working in the Utah and Colorado, their respective state highway departments racked up massive cost overruns on major highway projects (Utah), and were found to have spent excessively on consultants and violated state laws regarding contract bidding (Colorado).
One firm, AtkinsRéalis, just acquired David Evans & Associates (DEA), with $35 million in contracts for ODOT’s I-5 Rose Quarter project. A decade ago, DEA that was the largest consultant to the failed Columbia River Crossing, and which Washington state auditors found had $17 million in questionable billings.
The AtkinsRéalis-Horrocks report provides an extremely limited analysis of ODOT’s management problems. It cites no statistics on project spending or cost overruns, and relies heavily on interviews with un-named ODOT staff and stakeholders as the basis for its conclusions. This is despite the fact that billions in cost overruns have been documented for a series of projects, stemming from design bloat (independent engineers say ODOT designed the Rose Quarter at least 40 feet too wide), and consistent failures in geotechnical analysis (which have led to huge cost increases for the Abernathy, Center Street and Hood River bridge projects).
The AtkinsRĂ©alis-Horrocks report recommendations largely duplicate previous recommendations or measures Oregon has already implemented, with minor changes.
- AtkinsRéalis/Horrocks recommend creating a “major projects office” to centralize management of large projects; in 2019, ODOT created the “Office of Urban Mobility and Megaproject Delivery” to do much the same.
- AtkinsRéalis/Horrocks recommended creating a “major projects dashboard.” ODOT, since 2022 has maintained, and claims to update daily a “Transportation Project Tracker” that covers most of the same information.
- AtkinsRéalis/Horrocks recommends creating a joint executive/legislative/stakeholder “major projects committee,” to oversee large projects. The 2017 Legislature created two such entities: A “Task Force on Transportation Mega Projects,” and a Continuous Improvement Advisory Committee, with essentially the same missions and similar membership.
- AtkinsRéalis/Horrocks recommends that ODOT employ a management tool called “RACI” short for responsibility, accountability, consultation and information to define decision-making processes. That same recommendation was made to ODOT by McKinsey in 2017, and ODOT already maintains elaborate RACI checklists for its contracting processes.
AtkinsRéalis/Horrocks recommends that ODOT hire more consultants to augment its expertise and “mentor” its staff, and specifically recommends consultants with “substantial public sector expertise as state DOT leaders”—i.e. people like Mr. Marshall and Mr. Laipply, and their firms.
Unfortunately, this new group of consultants has the same history of cost overruns and deep conflicts of interest as the team hired by ODOT last year. These consultants from Utah and Colorado both come from state DOTs which have—despite their supposedly “model” practices—had very large cost overruns on major highway projects. Both are now responsible for marketing tasks within their firms, meaning finding state DOTs who will purchase their services. One consultant is “chief revenue officer” for his firm—i.e. in charge of generating more billings. The other is looking to build “partnerships”—a preferred industry euphemism for getting state DOTs to hire them for large projects.
The authors of the report, Shane Marshall of Horrocks and Joshua Laipply of AtkinsRéalis come from state DOTs with a checkered past when in comes to managing construction costs. Both have recently left state highway departments to go to work for their respective consulting firms, chiefly to sell their new employers services to agencies like ODOT.
Shane Marshall worked as a key engineer for the Utah Department of Transportation for more than two decades, rising to the level of Deputy Director. In Utah, the cost of a 17-mile expansion of I-15 through Salt Lake City has more than doubled in 2023–after the Legislature approved funding for the project. The Salt Lake Tribune reported:
The project, to expand the freeway between Salt Lake City and Farmington, would cost more than double what the Legislature has already allocated. . . . UDOT estimated the cost for the project might now be $3.7 billion — more than double the $1.7 billion the department initially estimated, for which the Utah Legislature has already allocated funding.
Shane Marshall is now “Chief Revenue Officer” for Horrocks, a Utah-based engineering consulting firm, that is part of the “Trilon Group.” As the company’s website makes this clear Marshall leads the firm’s “StateDOT expansion strategy.” Horrocks is the firm that did substantial consulting work on the I-15 expansion project, including the traffic projections used to justify the project.
Joshua Laipply worked for the for the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) from 2012 to 2019, ascending to Chief Engineer. During his tenure, independent reviews found that CDOT had higher than average expenses, and had ignored state contracting law, leading to excessive spending. According to the Colorado Springs Gazette, Colorado spent more than twice as much as peer states per lane mile on consulting services. It reported:
A Legislative Council study found that Colorado spent $211 million on consulting engineers in 2016, far more than other states included in the study. Over four years, roughly one-third of CDOT construction expenditures ended up going to consultant services.
A 2023 state audit also found that ColoradoDOT used alternative delivery methods to ignore low bids without following law:
Since 2012, the Colorado Department of Transportation spent $4.1 billion on construction projects that bypassed strict low-bid practices, but while doing so the state agency lacked sound policies guiding such spending, which resulted in statutory violations and payments above fair market value, a Colorado state auditor report concluded.
Laipply recently started working for a consulting firm, AtkinsRĂ©alis, where he is in charge of marketing the firm’s services:Â Atkins RĂ©alis provides construction engineering services for highway expansion projects around the US, including Texas, Washington, Idaho and Colorado.
Atkins RĂ©alis buys in to Oregon market
Laipply’s firm, Atkins RĂ©alis just agreed to acquire Portland-based engineering firm David Evans and Associates, for $300 million. Atkins Realis is hardly a disinterested party: they have a strong proprietary interest in landing future business with Oregon’s department of transportation.
David Evans and Associates (DEA) has profited handsomely of ODOT spending over the past two decades. DEA was the lead contractor for the failed Columbia River Crossing Project, and billing $44 million–the largest share of the $200 million spent on planning and designing the CRC from 2004 to 2013.
The Washington State Auditor determined that $17 million of the amounts paid to DEA were “questionable” because 30 subcontractors “did not submit proper overhead and profit markup documentation to the general contractor, David Evans and Associates.”
The audit determined the CRC spent another $1.45 million it deemed “excessive” to David Evans, its Portland-based general contractor.
Patricia McCaig occupies one of the most unusual positions in power in Oregon political history: carrying the title of aide to the governor while being paid $417,000Â Â since 2009 by a major consultant on the state’s biggest public-works project ever.
The force behind Oregon’s massive freeway project works for the governor—and a private company that wants it built.” Willamette Week, February 26, 2013. https://www.wweek.com/portland/article-20317-the-woman-behind-the-bridge.html
Warmed over recommendations
The AtkinsRĂ©alis/Horrocks report has a series of recommendations that are eerily similar to actions taken over the past decade to supposedly improve management at ODOT.
Renaming the Urban Mobility Office as the “Major Projects Group.” ARH’s very first recommendation re-christening the existing urban mobility office as a “Major Projects Group.”
It’s hard to tell how the changed name changes the responsibility or management of this team. Established in 2019, the office was originally named the “Office of Urban Mobility and Mega Project Delivery.” It was pitched as doing almost exactly what ARH recommended. Press accounts published sweeping claims that the office would address stakeholder feedback, and a implement a comprehensive approach that would deliver innovative solutions.
This new focus responds to public and stakeholder feedback and aligns with the visions of the Oregon Transportation Commission and ODOT Director Kris Strickler for the future of the transportation system.
ODOT’s newly formed Office of Urban Mobility and Mega Project Delivery is a key part of that comprehensive approach. While its work will continue to evolve, the office will immediately focus on developing and delivering innovative solutions for comprehensive congestion relief as directed by the Legislature in HB 2017.
Strickler laid out his vision for the new office.
“The creation of this office not only signals ODOT’s commitment to addressing congestion on all fronts but signals our new way of doing business.
There’s some minor shuffling of staff and decision-making authority, but the scope of the office’s responsibility remains the same:Â projects costing more than about $100 million.
A dashboard to track major projects. ARH recommends that ODOT establish a single, centralized dashboard for project information.
The ARH report, however, doesn’t mention that ODOT has such a webpage–the Project Tracker website–and has had since 2022, which contains this information.  ODOT says the tracker “The interactive Transportation Project Tracker shows how and where Oregon’s state and federal transportation funds are spent by local, state and federal agencies. You’ll find information about the scope, schedule and budget of projects and studies . . .
Because ARH doesn’t acknowledge the existence of ODOT’s Tracker, it’s hard to know whether there’s any substantive difference between what they’re proposing and what ODOT already has.
Create an oversight committee. One of ARH’s long term recommendations is creating a broad oversight committee with representatives from the legislative and executive branches, local governments, and private sector representativs to monitor large projects.
This mirrors a similar oversight group—the Task Force on Mega Transportation Projects—created as part of the 2017 legislative transportation package.
SECTION 121. (1) The Task Force on Mega Transportation Projects is established. For the purposes of this section, a “mega transportation project” includes transportation projects, as defined in ORS 367.010, that cost at least $360 million to complete, that attract a high level of public attention or political interest because of substantial direct and indirect impacts on the community or environment or that require a high level of attention to manage the project successfully.
That Task Force on Mega Transportation Projects consisted of four legislators, and five other members including Oregon Transportation Commission members and road users appointed by the governor. It was tasked with monitoring projects of $350 million or more, and was legally required to file a report on its work–which it never did. It met just twice before in sunsetted in 2018.
HB 2017 also directed the Oregon Transportation Commission to create a “Continuous Improvement Advisory Committee.” Section 10 of the bill directs the committee to “advise the commission on ways to maximize the efficiency of the department to allow increased investment in the transportation system . . . develop key performance measures, based on desired outcomes . . . report to the commission at least once per year on the status of key performance measures . . and in each odd-numbered year, the commission shall submit a report . . . to the [Legislature’s] Joint Committee on Transportation.” The committee focuses on projects costing $50 million or more and meets about nine times per year. ODOT’s website describes it as follows:
Management Buzzwords. A popular management buzzword is “RACI” for “responsible, accountable, consulted and informed.” The AHR report calls for ODOT to adopt a RACI framework to guide its relations with partners and contractors.
But that should sound familiar. McKinsey made almost exactly the same recommendation in its 2016 report on improving ODOT’s management.
And, in fact, ODOT does use “RACI” to spell out how it manages different construction contracting arrangements, including “Design-Build” and “Construction General Manger Contractor.” Here’s the RACI framework from ODOT’s website:
But that should sound familiar. McKinsey made almost exactly the same recommendation in its 2016 report on improving ODOT’s management.
Hire more consultants. Unsurprisingly, the AtkinsRéalis/Horrocks group thinks that ODOT should do more to hire consultants, both to augment the agency’s expertise and to guide and mentor ODOT staff. They say consultants should be selected for their “ability to support strategic-decision-making and mentor ODOT staff.” They point out that “many consultants bring significant public sector experience, including former DOT leaders.”
AtkinsRĂ©alis/Horrocks, 2025, “ODOT Management Review” page 14
AtkinsRĂ©alis/Horrocks, 2025, “ODOT Management Review” page 11
This is a thinly veiled marketing pitch. Both Laipply and Marshall are “former DOT leaders” and they are claiming that hiring them will “avoid costly errors.”  They can also “mentor” ODOT staff.
This is both self-interested, and very much on brand: recall that Laipply’s Colorado Department of Transportation was called out by state auditors for excessive spending on consultants compared to other states. It’s also worth noting that an independent analysis of state road construction costs, published by the Brookings Institution—which isn’t in the business of selling engineering and management services to state transportation departments—concluded that excessive reliance on consultants was one of two major factors driving higher costs.
Formatted PDF file of Uninvited Testimony: Â Cortright_Uninvited_27May2025.